The Somali question in Ethiopia has remained a political puzzle for quite some time now. Besieged by manmade disasters and natural calamities, what is today known as the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (SRS) has had more than its fair share of political turbulence, economic anorexia, death and dearth. In less than half a century, the region has changed hands (British, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Italy) and names (Hararge, Ogaden, Kilil5, Somali Region). Such massive cocktail of problems wrecked havoc upon on the populace of this land but the resilience of the people has never been broken. From Sayid Mohamed to Suldan Olal Dinle to Hussien Gire to Sheik Abdinasir Sheikh Aden and Ali Gudal, the sons and daughters of this land stood up to resist external domination, marginalization and exploitation.
Equally devoted successive Ethiopian regimes, however, left no stone unturned to subjugate the region and its population. Although some development projects have been implemented under the EPRDF, the region remains very backward and is mired in grinding poverty, even by Ethiopian standards. Literacy rate is as low as 10%, majority of children are malnourished (the government banned Save the Children (UK), MSF and other agencies to carry out any nutritional survey since 2007).Recurrent draught compounded by commercial food blockade weighed in to create severe food insecurity in the region since the government launched the scorched earth operations. Livestock, the source of livelihood in the region, has no proper market nor do pastoralists have access to quality vet services. Political participation remains elusive and the Somalis are simply denied representation based on the constitution and census. Somali inhabited regions have been given out to the Oromo Administration for political and electoral reasons.
In sum, it is fair to say the long standing grievances of the people of Somali Regional State (SRS) against successive Ethiopian governments stand today as they stood during the Monarch and Marxist regimes. These accumulated and unaddressed social, economical and political grievances legitimise any struggle and quest for equality, respect, freedom and dignity. Various political movements, bearing different ideologies, emerged to resist domination and subjugation. ONLF is the latest torch-bearer in the line of duty. However, its political objective, representation and future direction continue to generate debate among the intellectuals of the Somali Region. We think ONLF is at crossroads and its existence is being challenged. Should ONLF reform to withstand these challenges?
ONLF’s early days
ONLF celebrated its 26th anniversary about three months ago. Created by WSLF’s youth party, the organization spent its life in exile until 1991 which marked the fall of the Dargue and the rise to power of the TPLF/EPRDF in Ethiopia. ONLF, with the invitation of TPLF/EPRDF, participated in creating Ethiopia’s transitional government. But, after a brief honeymoon with TPLF/EPRDF, the front opted for an armed struggle and deserted its political control over the embryonic Somali State in 1994. No one knows with certainty what led to this dramatic decision, but here are plausible explanations (1) ONLF, being the first Somali political party to dip its finger into the hot political pot with a dozen ethnic-based organizations (all controlled and directed by TPLF) was new to the Ethiopian political scene. (2)Armed struggle is the only form of struggle our people have known to respond to political grievances, (3) The immaturity of the ONLF leaders and their inability to unite and create strong political structure that amasses support from all Somalis during their time in power contributed to the fall out; ONLF resorted to clan politics and majority rule and this become a rallying point for all the non-Ogadeni groups; TPLF took the opportunity to create a mesh of clan-based political entities within the Somali Region. Subsequently, in July 1993, Abdulahi Sadi’s government, accused of mismanagement and corruption, was ousted from power. (4) Perhaps the most decisive factor of all is the narrow and suffocating political space created by TPLF that led to the beginning of another round of armed struggle in the region.
More than 15 years lapsed since ONLF waged the armed struggle. The objective of this article is simply to touch on major weaknesses (key reform areas) of the organization -not about the front’s “‘good” performance (which will not be helpful; suffice to say khayr wax kuma yeelee shar u tooghaay). Nevertheless, in planning this article, some of us wondered if the organization has attained any meaningful goals at all. It all depends on whether you take the cup is half full perspective or the cup is half empty perspective but the fact that the organisation managed to persevere in the face of a very powerful regime for more than a decade is a source of pride that motivates ONLF foot soldiers as well as its leaders. It is also true that, despite the government’s military might, this rebel group has rendered the region instable, a blow to the government’s political and development objectives (of course we are not suggesting that instability is good for the region). What is also seen as a political and military success is the fact that the organization chased away oil exploration companies from the region despite the government’s attempt to protect them. Others celebrate the fact that ONLF has thwarted government’s ‘highlander resettlement policy” along the banks of rivers and the fertile land of the region-mainly in Gode. It is also perceived that the rebel movement has given the Somali question in Ethiopia a publicity-both positive and negative, and recognition among the political elite of Ethiopia; a publicity which could potentially be tapped into in the future. Lastly and most importantly many intellectuals think that this organization, good or bad, is the only political entity that arguably has a defined political structure, objective and managed to mobilize noteworthy support within and outside the country.
It is thorny to assess ONLF’s performance as it is not easy to discuss the institutional reform ONLF needs to undertake. We, however, will touch on some of the salient areas that are visible to an outsider.
ONLF’s core deficiencies and key reform areas:
Name
The letter O in the ONLF rings a bell. Despite of the historical emergence of the name, which was coined by the European colony, many citizens of the Somali Region do not feel accommodated in an organization that claims to represent all citizens regardless of their clan or creed. Furthermore, the organization has not done much to accommodate other Somalis. Many argue it may be too late to address the letter O in the ONLF primarily because the organization has mobilised its support on such platform since its formation. According to their top cadres, to drop the name will mean disturbing the status-quo and introducing an element of irritation in the organization’s power base which does not seem to be ready for such a change at this stage. However, ONLF needs to show its flexibility towards the creation of a social space that encourages a discourse on the name (So far ONLF has not shown that flexibility). Changing the name will not cause an immediate overflow of support to the front by non-traditional constituencies but the framework is of concern not what will happen afterwards.
Lack of trained cadres
Perhaps you, as a reader, have encountered an unapologetic ONLF cadre, usually young and uneducated man of Ogadeni descent or brutally innocent woman affected by the war, lecturing about the ‘cause’ or halganka as they call it. The cause is just and these men and women have noble intentions. But their superficial knowledge about the cause, the region, the enemy, and their lack of deep understanding of the work of a political cadre shows how poorly directed and trained these cadres are. The capacity challenges are understandable but these cadres seem to lack the minimum cadre orientation one would expect of a mature rebel group. The approach of these cadres is ineffective; their attitude towards those who question them about the halgan is full of hatred; they have developed many websites to character assassinate anyone that voices opposition, travel to the region, question their approach or oppose their philosophy. The apparent lack of training and direction alienates many citizens who would otherwise want to contribute to the cause.
Civilian casualties
ONLF is not comparable to the brutal RUF of Serra Leone whose infamous signature was chopping off limps or Koni’s LRA which is known for its senseless rape of Ugandan women and children. Nonetheless, increasing number of civilians have been deliberately or accidently killed by ONLF. They have taken revenge on those who have not supported them or allegedly aided the government. Furthermore, humanitarian workers have also become victims. Very recently MSF was attacked in the Somali region. This is neither acceptable nor beneficial for the struggle. If ONLF wants to borrow something from the Eritrean liberation struggle it should be the strict command systems and adherence to party rules so that ONLF regiments do not to fire on buses or burn NGO vehicles without the approval of the military and political leadership.
Equality and representation
ONLF is fighting against repression. It would make every sense to expect ONLF to not engage in oppression. The organization has miserably failed to broaden its support base beyond traditional constituencies. This is a clear signal of ONLF’s short sighted vision. It is also an indication of the totalitarian nature of the front, an attitude of love- me –or- loath- me either way I represent you. If ONLF cannot capitalise on the grievances and marginalization shared equally by those who live in Ferfer all the way to Aisha, it is hard to see its effectiveness in ruling the region. It may be justifiable, for tactical or spatial reasons not to operate in some parts of the region but that can not be a barrier to recruit or enlist supporters outside the Ogaden clan. Moreover ONLF has not done enough to reach out to Ogaden and no-ogaden intellectuals in the Diaspora. Mostly, top ONLF leaders and cadres seem to enjoy being around supporters who sing the same songs.
Leadership and lifestyle
Though we could not find any published or circulated document regarding the ONLF’s admin chart, we were informed that the organization is led by an executive committee that has a dozen or so members and a bloated central committee. Out of the dozen executive committee members at least nine are living a peaceful life outside the region (mainly in the west) with their families. Yes, the presence of some of these leaders outside the region might be necessary on both political and operational levels. However, the number should be justifiable and all the leaders should get their quota of hardship…they should taste the heat waves of the arid land and should travel on foot with the rank and file members. After all these leaders have subjected the youth of the region to such a hardship and it is only fair to say that these leaders should experience some of the hardship. This is not to say ONLF cadres and leaders do not travel to the region but there seems a lack of commitment on the part of the leadership to disturb the comfortable and risky free lives they are leading in Europe and North America.
Another issue of importance is ONLF’s need to reform its leadership. We are not naïve to say ONLF should restructure itself at this very moment. Yet, this should be a priority as soon as time permits (may be when the current round of government’s military and political campaigns subside), ONLF should immediately look into the leadership reform agenda. One should not belittle the contributions the current leadership has made but it is in the interest of any organization to recruit new bright leaders. It is true that most of the intellectuals of the region have chosen to remain spectators. This is arguably the worst thing that could happen to a nation or a community. It seems many of them are just loyal to their egos and are indifferent to the suffering of their people. But many intellectuals also see that ONLF is neither ready for reform nor willing to open up space for dialogue. To some, ONLF and the regional government seem to be united in fighting the emergence of alternative groups. Those hardliners who think that they own ONLF because they have lived ONLF for almost quarter a century needs also to know that their sacrifice will only bear fruit if they let the organization reform and progress. Unless these leaders are self-interested agents there is no reason for them not to push for a reform even if that will mean stepping aside.
Attitude towards others
ONLF has so far maintained a downbeat attitude towards any individual or group that does not subscribe to its agenda. In fact it is even at odds with individuals and groups who closely work with the front but ask for some amount of space just so that they seem independent of ONLF in the eyes of the international community. Despite the emergence of many advocacy and human right groups that seem to be affiliated with ONLF, we were surprised to find that most of these organizations are at odds with some of the leadership simply because they are not taking orders from the ONLF leadership. ONLF’s war against the UWSLF and other groups is another example of how ONLF deals with groups that stand for the same cause but with different ideology. ONLF needs to reconsider this attitude. Fragmentation is not what we are calling for but ONLF needs to understand that individuals and groups should be applauded as long as they are advancing the same cause. We also think that ONLF needs to work with non-Somali Ethiopian groups whose agenda is to get rid of this regime even if there are differences on some issues (this will send a powerful message to TPLF).
Conclusion
In spite of the numerous deficiencies described above, ONLF fighters on the ground and their leaders have sacrificed their life, time and wealth to stand up for legitimate grievances; they have sustained the pride and bravery of this region’s revered people. The least ONLF has done the region is to safeguard the oil wealth beneath the soil which will turn into curse if explored without a genuine political settlement.
But ONLF needs to transform itself into a viable political organization that can not only lead the region to freedom/autonomy but also can create a society where the rule of law is respected and prosperity is created. This can only be achieved if and when all citizens are given equal opportunity to participate.
It would be to miss an important point if we do not address the issue of peace and ONLF. It is our firm believe that a political settlement would be the way to resolve the conflict in the region. But to sign a paper does not mean to get a peace. Lasting peace can only be achieved through genuine negotiations. One can say Ethiopia has not shown willingness to peaceful settlement in this conflict. Its apparent publicity oriented policy is testimony to that fact. Some may suggest that the ongoing peace agreements between Salahudin’s ONLF faction and UWSLF on one side, and the government on the other side is a step to that direction but we will not judge the book by its cover. We will give a chance to the so called peace agreements. Nevertheless, there are very basic questions that beg for answers: Has the government revisited its unconstructive policy toward the region?, Are innocent civilians still arrested without due process?, has the government shown a willingness to recognise the age old marginalization and injustice?, Are security forces and Tigray advisors still in full control of the administration of the region?, Are Somalis still represented at federal parliament by the same 23 instead of constitutional mandated 38 parliamentarians? Are the Somalis still the consumers of policies designed by TPLF controlled central government and citizens are not given the opportunity to participate in the design of those policies?, Unless the agreements can answer to those questions a change has not came to Somali region and Somalis will remain second class citizens in Ethiopia.
Despite all the challenges, we strongly believe that peace is possible. ONLF should know that the gun is not the ultimate solution but a temporary one. When the government becomes serious about peace agreements, ONLF should be open to it. Of course without a third party mediator it is too much of a risk to trust TPLF. The latest victims of the so called ‘agreements’ with TPLF are the All Ethiopian Unity Party and the Ethiopian Democratic Party (Ethiopia’s loyal opposition who entered an agreement with TPLF prior to the election) and that should be a lesson to everyone in Ethiopia’s political arena.
This article is written by:
Karamarda Group
Executive Committee
The karamarda Group is a group of Somali Regional citizens who are interested in Democracy and Good Governance in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and could be reached at karamardagroup@gmail.com
Source: WardheerNews (link)
Somaliland army reportedly drove out Ethiopia ONLF rebels
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